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Social Construction of False 
Necessities and the Material Basis of 
Socio-Legal Power: 
A Reply to Irrationalism in Critical 
Legal Studies Critiques Identifying 
Latent Social Violence as a Potential New 
Material Foundation for Systematic 
Socio-Legal Theory* 
 
Samantha Godwin** 
 
Introduction 
 
Critical Legal Theory (“CLS”) has been characterized by two broad 
schools of thought. The first, instrumentalism, holds that legal rules serve 
specific social purposes, generally the systematic and structural 
application of power, and that these power structures can in some way be 
rationally described.
1
 The second, irrationalism, holds that law is too 
indeterminate to serve an instrumental function; that it is impossible to 
systematically account for social reality, because there is no social reality 
independent from socially constructed meaning.
2
 Both the irrationalist 
 
* Article presented at the Critical Legal Conference at the University of Utrecht, 
Sept 12, 2010 and the Conference on Critical Legal Studies at the University of Idaho, 
School of Law, October 22, 2011. I am grateful to Gary Peller and Louis Michael 
Seidman for their comments and advice on an earlier draft of this Article. 
** Research Fellow, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., Georgetown 
University Law Center; M.A., B.A., University College London, Department of 
Philosophy. 
1. “[I]nstrumentalists see legal rules as covertly furthering the efforts of certain 
groups (e.g., capitalists, whites, males) to dominate others. Different hierarchical orders 
require differing legal orders, so that ‘particular rules are needed . . . in developing 
capitalism, other rules in monopoly capitalism and so on.’” Phillip E. Johnson, Do You 
Sincerely Want to be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247, 286 n.103 (1984) (alteration in 
original) (quoting LIZARD (Peter Gabel ed.), Jan. 5, 1984, at 3.). 
2. Irrationalism can be defined as the position that 
 
legal rules[are] too indeterminate, incoherent, and marginal to 
qualify for an instrumentalist role. Law is “merely an instance 
1
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understanding of law and society that came to dominate CLS, and the 
Marxian-influenced
3
 instrumentalist approaches that proceeded it, suffer 
from major explanatory gaps. Specifically, Marxian, dominance feminist, 
and other instrumentalist theories are vulnerable to the claim that they 
posit a false objectivity.
4
 When providing explanations and descriptions 
for social structures and legal outcomes, instrumentalist theories fail to 
adequately account for their own subjectivity and the ways in which their 
descriptions rely on socially constructed and socially contingent 
assumptions and concepts. When offering predictions, political 
strategies, and causal explanations, Marxian or instrumentalist 
approaches tend to be over-determinate, and reality rarely conforms 
exactly to their expectations and predictions. The irrationalist approach, 
however, suffers from insufficient explanation. Indeterminacy and 
irrationalism make for unsatisfying end points when inquiring into a 
social world that appears to be in some ways, highly predictable and 
seemingly well ordered.
5
 
In the American CLS movement, the recognition that social 
interests and legal questions are analytically indeterminate has led to the 
 
of social mythologizing,” and “there is no ‘true’ analysis that 
comports with the way things really are, because there is no 
hard social reality separate from our social construction of 
meaning.” 
 
 Since there is no ultimately rational way to think about or 
organize the world, there is no ultimate irrationalist program, 
no attempt to substitute “truth” for “ideology.” Only the 
message that every structure is provisional and none is 
necessary. 
 
 Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting LIZARD (Peter Gabel ed.), Jan. 5, 1984, at 4.). 
3. Throughout this Article, I use the term “Marxian” to describe the broad social, 
historical, and economic perspective based on Marx’s historical materialist conception of 
society, but without the political, revolutionary, or social transformative implications of 
“Marxist”—which I shall use to describe the position that more narrowly and 
comprehensively adopts Marx’s political philosophy in addition to his social theory. For 
an example of this use of the terms “Marxian” and “Marxist”, see Douglas Kellner, 
Preface to the 1998 Edition of HERBERT MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION, at xi, xiv, 
xviii (Routledge 1998). 
4. See James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social 
Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 724-25 (1985). 
5. See Mark Tushnet, Some Current Controversies in Critical Legal Studies, 12 
GERMAN L. J. 290, 291-92 (2011) [hereinafter Tushnet, Controversies] for a discussion of 
similar related criticisms of irrationalism as falling into complete subjectivity and lacking 
explanatory power. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/4
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apparent predominance of the irrationalist position advanced by Duncan 
Kennedy, Peter Gable, and others.
6
 This position offers highly persuasive 
critiques of Marxist, feminist, and law and economics approaches to 
social and legal theory by demonstrating how each view relies on 
unstable assumptions about the way the law interacts with society, how 
people exercise power, and whose interests the law advances.
7
 To use a 
simplified example, to the Marxist who argues that the interests of 
property owners determine the content of the law, the irrationalist may 
reply that property exists only insofar as the state allocates and enforces 
property rights, so the unidirectional model of the economic base 
determining the legal superstructure is incoherent. Moreover, if the law is 
analytically indeterminate,
8
 then law cannot be said to advance any 
 
6. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 286 n.103. 
7. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 4; Johnson, supra note 1; Tushnet, Controversies, 
supra note 5. 
8. The so-called “indeterminacy thesis” is one of the most significant insights of the 
legal realists; adopted and expanded by the CLS movement. While most authors refer 
simply to the ‘indeterminacy thesis,” it seems that the thesis actually has both a form 
specific to legal analysis and a form general to all types of discourse that intersect with 
the law, including rights discourse, social theory, class interests, ideology, policy, and 
more generally any systematic account of interpersonal interaction. Put simply, the legal 
indeterminacy thesis holds that the sources of formal law such as statutes, precedents and 
constitutions, do not in and of themselves analytically determine the outcome of legal 
disputes—even while adjudicators will inevitably reference bodies of laws while making 
legal decisions. This is possible because sources of law contain contradictions, 
ambiguities, and gaps, and legal discourse contains conflicting norms for applying and 
interpreting law, such that a credible and persuasive case can be made for either side of 
any legal dispute and there exists no independent standard for determining which case is 
more persuasive. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1003 (1985); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 
BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 
(1984) [hereinafter Tushnet, Rights]; Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political 
History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1525 (1991) [hereinafter Tushnet, Studies]; Mark Tushnet, 
Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 339 (1996) [hereinafter 
Tushnet, Indeterminacy]. More generally, however, once legal terms and concepts are 
destabilized, the conclusions of social theories that assume those terms as background 
conditions would also be indeterminate. For example, Tushnet argues 
 
[c]lassical social theory had not paid much attention to questions of 
law, yet legal terms—in particular, “ownership of private property”—
played a large role in the fundamental structure of Marxist and, to a 
lesser extent, Weberian social thought. If those terms were, as we 
believed them to be, indeterminate, the conclusions of classical social 
theory regarding the inevitable triumph of the working class or of the 
“iron cage” of bureaucratic society rested on sand.  In short, the 
indeterminacy thesis threatened the social theory that legal realists 
had relied on to resolve the normative and descriptive difficulties 
3
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particular class interests because law would not, if indeterminate, 
determine legal outcomes at all.
9
 A traditional instrumentalist reply that 
external factors such as wealth and power condition judicial outcomes is 
also insufficient because political commitments, ideologies, and class 
interests may themselves be shown to be analytically indeterminate.
10
 
Added to these issues, the irrationalists also apply post-structuralist 
critiques of meaning, suggesting that the concept of power in general is 
subjective,
11
 and that society’s hierarchies are not grounded in the 
 
exposed by their analysis of law. Put a different way, the 
indeterminacy thesis, developed in the specific context of legal 
doctrine, created an atmosphere in which the deterministic leanings 
of classical social theory were suspect. 
 
Tushnet, Studies, supra, at 1525. 
9. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 4, at 724 (“If our understanding of legal realism and 
of linguistic theory shows us that legal rules are wildly indefinite and incapable of precise 
application, how can the legal system be tilted (even to a relative extent) in favor of any 
group or form of economic organization?”). 
10. Duncan Kennedy makes this point with regard to ideologies: 
 
The strategy seems to be one of exposing the indeterminacy of the 
surface level of discourse in order to get at the “real” level, which is 
ideology. 
 
     But the ideologies are themselves just “texts” that each individual 
judge will have to interpret before he or she can decide what is 
“required” by his or her presupposed political commitment. Saying 
that the judge is a liberal constrained activist doesn’t tell us what 
liberalism “requires” in any particular case, because of the possibility 
of strategic behavior within the process of ideological interpretation. 
 
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, 187-88 (1997). 
11. See Boyle, supra note 4, at 724-25. 
 
Instead of the vulgar Marxist picture that there is one layer of reality, 
the economy, that is the most real and the most determinative, 
[Robert Gordon] suggests that reality is socially constructed. “What 
we experience as ‘social reality’ is something that we ourselves are 
constantly constructing; and this is just as true for ‘economic 
conditions’ as it is for ‘legal rules.’” The economy ceases to have the 
appearance of fateful objectivity that a Marxist theory attributes to it. 
History and world become the creation of social subjects acting 
collectively, rather than being the result of impersonal structural 
determinants. 
 
Id.; see, e.g., SAUL NEWMAN, POWER AND POLITICS IN POSTSTRUCTURALIST THOUGHT, 
NEW THEORIES OF THE POLITICAL, 51-53, 158 (2005). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/4
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material conditions of life, but in the ideologies of false necessity and 
self-repression—what Peter Gabel calls the pact of the withdrawn 
selves.
12
 
Although the post-structuralist-influenced irrationalists provide 
good reasons for rejecting efforts to systematically account for legal and 
social phenomena, they invite the obvious question of “where do we go 
from here.” The problem with leaving social theory thoroughly 
deconstructed without offering a positive theory of law and society is 
that, while legal and social developments are far from mechanical or 
deterministic, they often appear predictable and, in a certain intuitive 
sense, “rational.” If legal and social questions are radically indeterminate 
and not merely indeterminate within the prevailing liberal discourse, then 
this appearance of predictability demands an explanation. 
Rather than offering a defense of existing socio-legal theories or 
exploring how irrationalist theories could be made more satisfying, this 
Article largely accepts the irrationalists’ critiques and instead considers 
how one might go about coherently re-grounding systematic socio-legal 
theories consistent with the insights of CLS. Even if one is persuaded by 
radical social constructivist arguments that truth, power, and social 
identity are subjective social constructs,
13
 not everyone is able to 
contribute to these social constructs equally. To use an example from 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, hierarchical observation and 
normalizing judgments are made asymmetrically—the guard observes 
and judges the prisoner and the prisoner modifies his or her behavior and 
subjective understanding of themselves as a result, to a far greater degree 
than vice versa.
14
 It may be true that the state must rule more by consent 
than by force,
15
 but some people’s consent counts for far more than 
others. 
Both self-repression
16
 and threats of physical violence
17
 represent 
 
12. See Peter Gabel, Phenomenology of Rights Consciousness and the Pact of the 
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984). 
13. Boyle, supra note 4, at 723-26. 
14. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 170-84 (Alan Sheridan trans., 
Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). 
15. See Peter Fitzpatrick, Law and Societies, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 128-30 (1984). 
16. Gabel, supra note 12, at 1583 (describing self-repression as “treating existing 
reality as fixed and embracing this idea with passion.”). 
17. Physical violence, as I use it in this Article, comes in two forms that have the 
same effect—imposing direct physical limitations on a person. This can be done either by 
applying physical force that they cannot physically overcome to restrict their movement, 
such as handcuffs or locking someone in a cell, or it can be done by inflicting physical 
5
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ways that social hierarchies enforce themselves and power is felt and 
exercised—but are they interchangeable? From a certain critical vantage 
point, it may seem that way. The use of organized, state-level coercive 
power seems to require self-repressive ideas on the part of the state’s 
agents, and the possibility for physical coercion gives rise to false 
necessity and self-repression in gross disproportion to the state’s actual 
enforcement capacities. 
In this Article I argue that these two forms of power are not 
interchangeable, and that while they both condition and contribute to the 
other, they do so asymmetrically. Why people repress themselves in the 
way they do, and how they experience false necessities, has to do with 
how they experience threats of physical force, such as the state’s criminal 
legal system. In any given individual, the experience of latent threats of 
physical force thus acts to condition their self-repressive ideas, but not 
vice versa: self-repression is often predicated on some expectation of 
social repression. The effects of physical force can then be seen as 
analytically prior to the effects of self-repression. This is to say that we 
can explain why people act as they do in the face of physical force 
without understanding the nature or content of their self-repression, but 
we cannot explain their self-repression without understanding the threat 
of physical force that conditions it and conditions the social context in 
which they find themselves. The experience of false necessity and self-
repression may be necessary to motivate the police, soldiers, and others 
to actually carry out physical state-coercion, so in this way self-
 
injury that compels certain behavior either through pain or through actual physical 
disability. The latter can either compel a narrow range of behavior, such as the muscular 
incapacitation of a taser or the loss of consciousness and eventual death from blood loss 
from a gunshot wound, or a relatively broad range of behavior, such as where someone 
runs, or perhaps fights back, when pepper is sprayed. In all cases, however, violence as I 
use the term imposes greater physical limitations on a person than they normally 
experience absent violence. Their physically possible choices are more constrained than 
they would be absent violence acting against them. Credible threats of violence can be 
similarly limiting because one’s choices are physically limited, only one step removed. 
Pointing a gun at someone and demanding compliance might not actually cause them to 
lose consciousness and die, but it still physically limits their options because of the 
known immediate potential for them to lose consciousness and die. Although one could 
ignore the orders of someone threatening them with a gun, she knows that she could not 
ignore the orders for very long. Violence is, in a physical way, something that cannot be 
ignored. It causes undeniable adverse physical affects in the persons to which it is 
directed. In contrast, I use the terms “self-restraint” or “self-repression” to describe when 
people feel that their apparent choices are limited, but the limits are not related to any 
physical restraint—when it remains physically possible for them to choose to do 
otherwise, and yet consistently do not. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/4
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repression could also be said to causally explain coercive force. 
However, because different people have radically differing degrees of 
access to organized physical coercion, those who can directly or 
indirectly wield physical coercion have a disproportional effect on the 
behavior and ideas of others, even if their own motivations arise from 
notions of false necessity. 
In this way, despite the subjective and self-enforced aspects of 
power the irrationalists identified, power is not an incoherent or 
inexplicable force in society, but one that has an ascertainable 
“directionality” from the powerful to the powerless. 
This Article will then argue that accepting this explanation of the 
relationship between the experience of threats of physical force and the 
experience of self-repression elucidates certain problems that have 
troubled critical legal theorists, such as why speech targeting certain 
groups is experienced as more oppressive than speech targeting other 
groups. Certain discursive formations carry more influence over people’s 
consciousness and behavior than others, based in part on how directly 
they evoke references and reminders to the latent threats of physical 
force that constrain our options. 
After a brief discussion of Marxist thought and relevant reactions to 
it from various critical theorists, this Article takes the irrationalist 
conclusions on Marxism as a starting point and attempts to reconstruct 
sociological explanations from there. The Article proceeds by exploring 
what, on a basic level, it means to experience feelings of constraint, self-
constraint, and the power of others acting on oneself. It arrives at the 
conclusion that there is a dialectical relationship between the recognition 
of latent or implied threats of coercive force, and the feeling of self-
repression, or self-constraining ideas. In this relationship, latent violence 
is analytically prior to self-constraining ideas. This observation can then 
be used to make sense of a number of topics of interest in critical legal 
theory. 
This Article is deliberately unconventional and exploratory. It 
begins by raising many conceptually problematic questions which cannot 
be answered simply or definitively. The point is not to provide any one 
right answer for these questions but to raise possible directions for new 
lines of inquiry rather than accepting the theoretical dead end that is 
irrationalism. I do not necessarily hope to offer a new systemizing theory 
that can withstand rigorous critique, but rather to show that such attempts 
remain possible and worthwhile even after the influence of post-
modernism and the deconstruction of the most significant social theories. 
7
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I. MARXISM AND CRITICAL THEORIST REACTIONS 
 
A. Background on Critical Theory: Marx, Foucault, and Hale 
 
To appreciate the dilemmas posed by irrationalist, post-structuralist 
critical theory, some background on the instrumentalist views they were 
responding to is necessary. Broadly speaking, the two prevailing 
“modern” traditional explanations of the state and society were the 
Marxist perspective of leftist political thought and the liberal perspective 
of Classical legal thought.
18
 
Marx’s views of the state, society, and law were complicated, varied 
tremendously throughout his productive life, and were riddled with 
apparent internal contradictions.
19
 Perhaps the most popular 
straightforward presentation of Marx’s views, however, is found in the 
1859 Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.
20
 
To quote a relevant excerpt: 
 
In the social production of their existence, men 
inevitably enter into definite relations, which are 
independent of their will, namely relations of production 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their 
material forces of production. The totality of these 
relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises 
a legal and political superstructure and to which 
correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The 
mode of production of material life conditions the 
general process of social, political and intellectual life. 
It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
existence, but their social existence that determines their 
consciousness.
21
 
 
18. See Donald F. Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 262, 270-
74 (1987); see also Duncan Kennedy, Toward An HistoricalUnderstanding of Legal 
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. L. & 
SOC. 3 (1980) (describing the details on the history of Classical legal thought.). 
19. See RONALDO MUNCK, MARX @ 2000: LATE MARXIST PERSPECTIVES (St. 
Martin’s Press 2000). 
20. See GERALD COHEN, KARL MARX’S THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENCE, 375 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2000). 
21. KARL MARX, Preface to A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/4
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The Marxist view of society, power, law, and the state, can be seen 
to have several components. First, it assumes that there are in fact 
“definite relations, which [exist] independent of [people’s] will[s].”22 
These definite relations are the relations of material production which 
constitute a basic economic structure.
23
 This basic economic structure 
functionally explains
24
 the laws and politics of a society, which constitute 
a “superstructure” arising from and depending on the base structure. In 
this way, for Marx,
25
 there is a casual relationship between the structural 
mode of production, what can be said to really exist, and the 
superstructural phenomena that constitutes people’s ideas, their 
consciousness, and their legal, political, and intellectual lives. This 
Marxist theory can be described as an “instrumentalist” view of law and 
ideology, in that legal and political thinking are instruments of the 
structurally-based ruling class: law serves the needs and interests of the 
people who own the means of production, because laws and political 
ideas are generated by the relations of production. 
Parallel to this “bottom up” Marxist view of law and the state is a 
“top down” liberal or enlightenment conception of the state and society. 
In this view, power issues from some central governmental institution, 
such as the three branches of the American federal government, or a 
monarch or dictator; it is imposed on people externally by the state.
26
 For 
the liberals, private markets and private families exist pre-politically, 
though the state may, rightly or wrongly, intervene into them.
27
 Law is, 
in this model, instrumental in two senses. Law as interpreted by the 
judiciary acts to restrain state power against individuals and other 
 
ECONOMY, 9, 11 (Int’l Library Publ’g Co., 1904) (1859) [hereinafter MARX PREFACE] 
(emphasis added). 
22. Id. 
23. See id. 
24. See COHEN, supra note 20, at 247-97 (discussing “functional explanations” in 
Marxism in depth). 
25. Or, perhaps more accurately, for Marxists who accept the 1859 Preface as a 
definitive explanation of Marx’s position, such as Gerald Cohen and the Analytic 
Marxists. There are many reasons to question whether the 1859 Preface was a very good 
summary of Marx’s theory of history at all, in that Marx allowed it to go out of print and 
many have argued it is incompatible with Marx’s historical writings. However, it is still 
massively influential on contemporary interpretations of Marx. 
26. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010) (1832) (presenting Austin’s “Command Theory” of the 
law). 
27. See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family 18 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985) (discussing the liberal concept of state intervention into 
the private market, and for why this is incoherent). 
9
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branches of the state by limiting what the state can do. Laws as created 
and enforced by the legislatures and government executives are also 
instrumental in that they are the means by which the state pursues its 
goals and interests, such as the general welfare, security, and so on. In 
this way, the liberal conception of the state is almost the Marxist 
conception of the state on its head: the parts of society Marxists take to 
be superstructural are, for liberals, the prime movers of legal and 
political thought, and capable of changing the economy.
28
 
The Frankfurt School and New Left thinkers that emerged from a 
Marxist tradition considered the base/superstructure model inadequate to 
describe the way ideas and culture interact with power.
29
 They 
recognized that supposedly superstructual phenomena like ideology and 
cultural ideas can have a power over people and society all their own.
30
 
Both the liberal model where power issues from the government, and the 
Marxist model where power issues from the economic base, appeared to 
be gross oversimplifications. The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, for 
example, introduced the concept of hegemony, where the ideas of the 
ruling class are so thoroughly entrenched in society that they cannot be 
recognized as ruling class ideology, but instead become a universally 
accepted framework for social discourse.
31
 The Marxist division between 
real, material power exercised at the base, and mere superstructural 
influence, was thought to no longer describe the way power is wielded 
most pervasively. The most pervasive form of power to these critical 
Marxists was that which causes subordinated people to participate in 
their own repression.
32
 
These theoretical developments provided a background for post-
structuralist thinkers such as Derrida to build upon. The post-
structuralists challenged Marx’s attempts to ground his theory in some 
sort of natural, fixed, material reality, like labor value, use value, 
 
28. Of course this is also an oversimplification. 
29. See ANDREW EDGAR & PETER SEDGWICK, CULTURAL THEORY: THE KEY 
CONCEPTS 25 (2d ed. Routledge 1999) (The Frankfurt School was itself a heavy influence 
on Critical Legal Studies methodology); see also David S. Caudill, Disclosing Tilt: A 
Partial Defense of Critical Legal Studies and a Comparative Introduction to the 
Philosophy of the Law-Idea, 72 IOWA L. REV. 287, 288 (1987). 
30. See Brosnan, supra note 18, at 305-12; see also GÖRAN THERBORN, THE 
IDEOLOGY OF POWER AND THE POWER OF IDEOLOGY (4th ed. 1999). 
31. See ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith & Quintin Hoare eds., 1971). 
32. See id; THERBORN, supra note 30; Brosnan, supra note 18, at 305-12. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/4
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commodities, or dialectical materialism.
33
 What are labor, value, and 
power anyway, absent human interpretation of these qualities? Marx 
recognized that value is not an intrinsic quality of an object, but one 
grounded in human relations to that object—specifically the amount of 
socially necessary labor required to create or obtain it.
34
 In this way, gold 
is more valuable than coal because it takes substantially more hours for a 
miner to locate and extract an ounce of gold than to locate and extract an 
ounce of coal—thus an ounce of gold represents a higher concentration 
of labor invested than an ounce of coal.
35
 But why should hours of labor 
invested take on some special, privileged status for denoting the real 
value of an object, especially when this type of value has little to do with 
exchange value or use value?
36
 Is this anything more than a subjective 
description of value, one informed not only by material reality but by the 
consciousness people develop within the social contexts they find 
themselves? 
Power, to the post-structuralists, is not something that is exerted in a 
mono-directional way but rather distributed throughout society.
37
 This 
provides the basis for a critique of Marx and the liberals based on social 
observation rather than analysis. In such a view, the Marxian 
base/superstructure model is incompatible with the way power seems to 
actually work in society. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault charted the 
development of the modern “disciplinary” society.38 The development 
for Foucault did not issue from one source of power or base economic 
formation, but developed for a variety of contingent purposes and merely 
happened to come together into the modern state form.
39
 Foucault 
understood the exercise of power itself as being more nuanced than the 
brute coercive power implicit in Marx’s work. In Discipline and Punish 
Foucault identified three principle techniques for social control: 
hierarchical observation,
40
 normalizing judgment,
41
 and examination.
42
 
 
33. JACQUES DERRIDA, SPECTERS OF MARX: THE STATE OF THE DEBT, THE WORK OF 
MOURNING, AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 88 (Routledge 1994). 
34. 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 212-13 (Fredrick 
Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Random House 1906). 
35. Id. 
36. See J.L. Simich & Rick Tilman, Critical Theory and Institutional Economics: 
Frankfurt’s Encounter with Veblen, 14 J. ECON. ISSUES 631 (1990). 
37. See SAUL NEWMAN, POWER AND POLITICS IN POSTSTRUCTURALIST THOUGHT: 
NEW THEORIES OF THE POLITICAL 53 (2005). 
38. FOUCAULT, supra note 14. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 170. 
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Merely observing people exerts control over them, as they modify 
their behavior while under a superior’s gaze. Normalizing judgments by 
a superior compel people to “reform” to the standards by which they are 
judged: discipline is not only comprised of punishment, but also of 
gratification from positive judgments.
43
 In this way, when people are 
classified against norms it introduces a “value-giving measure” which 
“hierarchizes, homogenizes, and excludes”—people are incentivized to 
conform to the norms and standards which thereby exert control over 
them.
44
 Examination combines these two techniques by observing from a 
position of superiority and judging against a norm, “establish[ing] over 
individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges 
them.”45 The examined is a “case” that may be judged and compared 
with others—”an object for a branch of knowledge” as Foucault puts 
it
46—in this way examination elicits in the examined a notion of both 
who they are and what they ought to do. Foucault goes on to describe 
Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, a prison designed so that the guards 
could, if they choose to, view any prisoner in any prison cell at any given 
time—because inmates do not know if they are being observed at any 
given moment, they always behave as if they were.
47
 
In this way, control is effectuated not by violence, or even by direct 
observation, but by the internal self-policing that each prisoner performs 
on themselves.
48
 Thus, power does not simply act on individuals as 
objects, rather it plays a constitutive role in the formation of individual 
subjectivity—power functions not as an external force on an individual, 
but as an internal subjective experience. The experience of external 
constraint then, can be said to actually arise largely from within oneself. 
For Foucault, panopticism is a phenomena that affects not only people in 
prison, but people throughout society.
49
 
 
 
 
 
41. See id. at 177. 
42. See id. at 184. 
43. See id. at 180. 
44. See Id. at 183. 
45. Id. at 184. 
46. Id. at 191. 
47. See id. at 195-231. 
48. See id. at 200-209. 
49. See id. at 207. 
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B. The Emergence of Irrationalism in Critical Theory 
 
These post-structuralist insights provide a backdrop to an anti-
instrumentalist, or irrationalist, perspective on law and power. CLS 
scholars such as Duncan Kennedy, Robert Gordon, and Mark Tushnet 
convincingly argue that legal reasoning is analytically indeterminate.
50
 
This is to say that, for any given set of facts in a case, the adjudicated 
outcome cannot be dictated by the contents of the law itself.
51
 Precedent 
does not constrain outcome, because one can always distinguish or 
analogize any given case from any precedential case by emphasizing its 
similarities or differences from that earlier case.
52
 Legal doctrine does 
not determine outcome, because the application of any set of general 
principles to any group of specific facts will always be disputable—and 
disputable within the norms of legal argumentation.
53
 
For example, rules can be interpreted broadly or narrowly; one can 
argue that a firm, bright line rule is necessary to ensure order and 
predictability, or alternatively that a flexible standard is needed to 
provide meaningful justice in varying circumstances.
54
 We can now see 
the possibility of a purely analytic
55
 post-structuralist critique of Marxian 
and Liberal legal theory rather than the observational critique implied by 
Foucault. If the law is indeterminate, the irrationalist position would ask, 
how can it possibly act as an instrument of the interests of an economic 
ruling class? If the rules have no ability to dictate outcome, because legal 
decisions can come out however the adjudicator wants them to, then the 
law cannot really be said to advance any particular interests. 
A Marxist may argue that apparent under-determinacy in the law 
serves to legitimate the ruling class: the law would lack a legitimating 
effect if the economic elites won every single case. Instead the ruling 
class must lose often enough to convince the rest of society that law 
 
50. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 8; Kennedy, supra note 8; Tushnet, Rights, supra 
note 8; Tushnet, Indeterminacy, supra note 8. 
51. See Boyle, supra note 8; Kennedy, supra note 8; Tushnet, Rights, supra note 8; 
Tushnet, Indeterminacy, supra note 8. 
52. See Boyle, supra note 8; Kennedy, supra note 8; Tushnet, Rights, supra note 8; 
Tushnet, Indeterminacy, supra note 8. 
53. See Boyle, supra note 8; Kennedy, supra note 8; Tushnet, Rights, supra note 8; 
Tushnet, Indeterminacy, supra note 8. 
54. See Boyle, supra note 8, for a fuller discussion. 
55. By “analytic,” I simply mean proceeding via logical analysis of the entailments 
of Marx’s theoretical framework, rather than considering whether observationally the 
state of the social world appears to confirm Marx. 
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functions independently of their interests. A Marxist could then argue 
that the law remains “tilted” to favor the establishment—serving the 
interests of economic elite more successfully over time than a system 
that mechanically delivered judicial victories.
56
 
This argument, however, clearly fails in the face of the more radical 
indeterminacy critique. It is only possible for the law to have a “tilt” if 
the law can dictate outcomes to a degree, but if a valid legal argument 
can be made for either side of any case, then the law itself does not 
suggest any outcome at all; it remains for a judge to choose which legal 
argument he or she prefers.
57
 An instrumentalist response might be that 
while the law itself does not determine judicial outcomes, external 
factors influence courts in such a way so that they have a tendency more 
often than not to come out on the side of the ruling class. 
However, just as the law is indeterminate, Duncan Kennedy and 
other CLS scholars have effectively argued that the interests of any given 
class or entity are also indeterminate.
58
 For example, is the minimum 
wage in the interests of the bourgeoisies or the proletariat? It could be 
argued that minimum wage serves the interests of the proletariat against 
the interests of the bourgeoisies, because it cuts into bourgeois profit 
margins and increases proletarian compensation, ending the race to the 
bottom in wages. Alternatively, a minimum wage might be in the 
interests of the bourgeoisies because collectively restricting the rate of 
exploitation prevents some of the self-destructive tendencies of the 
capitalist ruling class and staves off revolution amongst its workforce.
59
 
Both accounts seem plausible within a Marxian paradigm of class 
interests. 
An even more devastating critique of Marxism is that Marx’s 
descriptions of the economic base appear to assume a contingent legal 
ideology. The Marxist theory that the owners of the means of production, 
which is to say, the ruling class, determine the laws of any given society, 
presupposes the legal concepts of “ownership” and “property” as if these 
 
56. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Critical Legal Theory Today, in ON PHILOSOPHY IN 
AMERICAN LAW 64 (Francis J. Mootz III ed., 2009); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO 
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 290-95 (1987); Caudill, supra note 29. 
57. See Boyle, supra note 4, at 724. 
58. See KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 50-54. 
59. See id. Duncan Kennedy similarly argued that ideologies were indeterminate in 
their specific application and one could argue that a particular outcome is either liberal or 
conservative. Id. 
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concepts were pre-political.
60
 In Coercion and Distribution in a 
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, Robert Hale demonstrates that 
“property” exists only insofar as the state decides to assign a duty of non-
interference on “non-owners” and the privilege to waive this duty on 
“owners.”61 
A person the state classifies as a “non-owner” may not use an item 
or a parcel of land that is another’s “property” because the state will use 
coercive force against the non-owner if they do.
62
 A person the state 
classifies as an “owner,” however, may use her “property” and has the 
discretion to allow others to take or access her property.
63
 This set of 
legal privileges gives “owners” great leverage over other people in a 
society where all the things needed for the basic necessities of life such 
as food, shelter, clothing, and so on are owned by someone.
64
 In this way 
the categories of “owners” and “non-owners” depend only on who the 
state assigns these roles to—property as such does not exist 
independently of state enforcement of property rights and the state 
assignment of ownership.
65
 Ownership of property is, in this way, not a 
relationship of people over objects, but people over other people 
mediated by the state.
66
 It cannot be said that there is a pre-political 
private market into which the state “ intervenes” when it regulates 
business practices, in that all property relies on state intervention.
67
 To 
determine whether or not state action is present, one must only ask if the 
 
60. A similar critique of Marx is offered by Duncan Kennedy: 
 
It sounds as though Marx is treating legal concepts as determined by 
the economic system, as epiphenomenal in the orthodox marxist 
sense. But that isn't it at all. Quite the contrary, his whole definition 
of commodity production is in terms of and therefore presupposes the 
legal concepts of private property and contract. The legal categories 
are built into the definition of the “social formation” or “mode of 
production.” 
 
Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of 
Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 978 (1985). 
61. Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 
POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470-79 (1923). C.f. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 
CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927). 
62. See Hale, supra note 61, at 471. 
63. Id. at 471-72. 
64. See id. at 472-74. 
65. See id. at 471. 
66. See id. 
67. See id. 
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state would respond if self-help was attempted. Were the non-owners to 
attempt a self-help solution of expropriating the owners’ property, the 
state’s police and courts would intervene to enforce criminal laws against 
theft.
68
 Because the state then is responsible for restraining people from 
taking self-help action, we can therefore see that state action is a 
prerequisite for property rights. 
It should be clear how the Marxist model of the relationship 
between the ruling class and the state becomes unhinged at this point, but 
a more detailed explanation by way of an example will be useful for this 
Article. If a property owner (“Sally”) calls the police to evict some 
peasant (“Martha”), who is working on Sally’s farm without her 
permission, it seems the case that the police are serving the interests of 
Sally. From this one might be tempted to think that law is an institution 
commanded and likely formed by the property owning class, as the 
Marxists suggest. Expanding this perspective further, the state could be 
presumed to be dependent on the ruling class, since those who own the 
means of production are the ones with the resources to finance the police 
and armies who defend their property against the dispossessed.
69
 
But consider the ontological and epistemological dimension of Sally 
evicting Martha. How do we know the farm is Sally’s and Martha is the 
trespasser rather than the other way around? Is Sally’s ownership of the 
farm a characteristic of the farm itself, or is owning the farm something 
that Sally is doing with the farm?
70
 On a functional level, it is Sally’s 
farm simply because the police order Martha to leave at Sally’s 
request—if they did the reverse, then functionally it would be Martha’s 
farm and not Sally’s. We know who owns the farm only by the state 
imposition of coercive force. The ontological reality of ownership and 
property consists of nothing deeper than the act and expectation of state 
enforcement. The earlier Marxian description of law and state action in 
the service of and dependent on the property owners is clearly 
incoherent. How can the property owners determine the law, when the 
law itself determines who the property owners are? 
 
68. See id. at 471, 478. 
69. In fact the state is often said to arise during the agricultural revolution when a 
sufficient amount of surplus grain was used to buy the services of non-farmers to act as 
guards of the owners remaining surplus. 
70. Of course there are other theories of what should be considered the basis of 
property that hold that this is the case, such as the labor-based theory of property 
advanced by John Locke. This normative question is not, however, directly relevant to 
the positivistic question of what is legal property in fact. 
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C.  The Problems of CLS Irrationalism Identified 
 
At this point, we can identify several fundamental problems that 
post-structuralist critical theory poses to Marxian instrumentalism. 
Anywhere the Marxist might want to claim that one element of society 
has explanatory potential for another element of society, the post-
structuralist critique exposes the relationship as indeterminate. 
The first fundamental problem concerns the relationship between 
the economy and the law. Marxists assert that the relations of production 
causally explain legal and political superstructure.
71
 Hale, however, 
demonstrated that the law is needed to determine the relations of 
production by assigning property rights
72—the so-called superstructure 
appears to be functionally prior to the supposed base. Marx claimed that 
material existence determines consciousness and that consciousness does 
not determine material existence.
73
 Hale showed that legal consciousness 
is necessary to determine the distribution of material goods in society.
74
 
So, the legal system cannot be grounded in the economy because the 
economy depends on the legal system—but then where does the legal 
system itself come from? An irrationalist need not provide any definite 
answers, but for anyone who wishes to ground a theory of social 
structure, law, and the state, this poses a devastating critique against any 
materialist explanation. 
The second problem has to do with the nature of the law itself. Marx 
believed that the law and political structure is organized in such a way to 
advance the interests of the ruling class. The CLS scholars, however, 
seemingly demonstrated that the law is so thoroughly indeterminate that 
it cannot be said to advance anyone’s interests by itself. Moreover, class 
interests are themselves indeterminate in critical legal theory.
75
 This 
poses a problem for anyone who wants to identify a rational system or 
structure in the law. 
The third problem concerns the relationships among people and 
between people and power. Marxism presumes that there are “definite 
relationships” among people and between people and the economy— 
 
71. MARX PREFACE, supra note 21. 
72. Hale, supra note 61, at 470-79. 
73. MARX PREFACE, supra note 21. 
74. See Hale, supra note 61, at 470-79. 
75. See Guyora Binder, Critical Legal Studies, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 281 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 
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material power relations that exist “independent of [one’s] will.”76 
Foucault and others have demonstrated that these power relations are not 
definite or concrete, they are instead subjective: the exercise of power 
depends on what each person in the relationship thinks is going on.
77
 
Moreover, power does not seem to meaningfully exist independent of 
one’s will; power consists primarily of self-repression.78 Thus the notion 
of power relations between people is unstable and subjective, not 
determinate. This poses a fundamental problem for anyone who wants to 
ground any explanation of social power in a materialist basis. 
In summary, the relation between the economy and the law, the 
nature of the law itself, and the nature of power relations in the economy 
and between people in general, all seem irrational and hopelessly 
ungrounded. Nothing seems determinate and every causal explanation 
proves to be circular. 
 
D. How to Proceed After the Irrationalist Critique 
 
Having arrived at this thoroughly deconstructed, apparently 
irrationalist starting point of accepting the critiques advanced by the 
post-structuralists, where do we go from here? One response is to follow 
the example of Mark Tushnet and Peter Gabel and optimistically think 
that, without structure delineating narrow parameters for social 
revolution, there are radical possibilities for change.
79
 If collective self-
 
76. MARX PREFACE, supra note 21. 
77. FOUCAULT, supra note 14. 
78. See id. 
79. Tushnet, Rights, supra note 8, at 1402-03. The hope and optimism of this 
revelation can be felt in the following passage from Tushnet: 
 
     It is of course difficult to live one's life believing that the social 
world is entirely constructed. Every time one thinks about it, the 
social world dissolves into a set of choices that one has made. (What 
is the meaning of writing this article?) Every decision becomes 
political. One asks oneself, do I think that this rather than that is, as 
far as I can tell now, more likely to advance the cause of the party of 
humanity? 
 
     But that question is itself tremendously liberating. It rests on an 
understanding of the social world that tells me that nothing is 
necessary, that everything is contingent, that I need not resign myself 
to how things are or to supporting those modest changes that are 
possible given the constraints placed on social life by a relatively 
unchanging human nature or by the demands of some technical 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/4
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repression is what enables the powerful to wield power, then 
deconstruction in and of itself may operate as a liberating political 
position.
80
 People can think themselves out of the false necessities of 
which power convinces them—the false belief that we must behave in a 
rigid social hierarchy where our choices feel externally dictated. The 
revelation that the only thing that is holding us back is ourselves has an 
explosive potential for liberation and social transformation. 
While the irrationalists are highly persuasive in critique of 
instrumentalist positions, there are aspects of this model that are deeply 
unsatisfying. If society and the law are really truly irrational and 
indeterminate, why do they appear to be so well ordered and so 
predictable? Not completely ordered or completely predictable of course, 
not deterministic, or mechanical—but highly predictable within certain 
parameters. To use a simplistic example, elections are often possible to 
predict with high degrees of certainty even though doing so relies on 
forecasting what millions of people will do, on their own, with no one 
supervising them. The notion that the law is “tilted” towards the wealthy 
is absolutely incoherent analytically, and yet, anyone conducting case 
research in an area of the law, like employment law, where courts have 
to decide between litigants who are owners or corporations and litigants 
who are poor people, will quickly arrive at the conclusion that it 
 
apparatus. That view of the social world does not ground the choice 
to join the party of humanity. What does ground the choice is the sure 
and certain knowledge that things can be better than they are. 
 
Id. 
 Echoing Tushent’s optimism, Gabel goes on to say that 
 
[W]hen a movement manages to richochet [sic] into existence 
through an unpredictable convergence of “igniting” material 
and cultural circumstances combined with an irreducible 
element of free commitment by those who take the risk of 
reciprocation, it produces a disalienating energy that wants to 
challenge everything that is (capitalism, patriarchy, hierarchy, 
“the system”) and a set of specific demands for change that 
derive from the movement's particular origins and that are 
inspired, consciously or unconsciously, by its vision of the 
larger end. 
 
Gabel, supra note 12, at 1587-88. 
80. See, e.g., KELMAN, supra note 56, at 269-79 (expressing the related view that the 
prevailing liberal legal ideology legitimizes existing power relations—so revealing the 
contradictions within that ideology helps people to see the potential for their own 
liberation). 
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certainly looks that way. 
If there is some semblance of predictability, even a mere tendency, 
such a tendency strongly implies that the way society is arranged is not 
random. If it is not random, then there must be some structure, even if it 
is a very loose structure that is unlike the satisfyingly elegant structure 
that Marx offered. The post-modern rejection of any effort to 
systematically explain society as merely exercises in grand narrative is 
itself a positive claim. It is a claim that society either has no structure, or 
has a structure that is absolutely impenetrable to human investigation and 
explanation. Having exposed Marxism, Christianity, the free market, 
nuclear family, scientific progress,
81
 and so on as conceptually flawed, 
some “incredulity towards metanarratives”82 by the post-structuralists is 
understandable. However, even though many attempts to ground social 
analysis in something material, or otherwise more than merely 
subjective, have been rightly deconstructed—simply being able to 
deconstruct many attempts at grounding social analysis is hardly a 
demonstration that social analysis cannot be grounded, or that a structure 
does not exist. 
 
II. IRRATIONALIST RECONSTRUCTION: DISCUSSION 
 
A. Beginning a “Reconstructive” Project 
 
In this Section, taking up this irrationalist starting point, I will 
explore what can be plausibly grounded in a non-circular explanation 
that is less vulnerable to the critiques earlier outlined. Property, power, 
and social identity do seem to be socially constructed. They do not seem 
to have a meaning outside of the social context that gives them one. 
These are not phenomena that seem to exist in the world naturally, 
outside of or beyond the human understanding and discourse about them. 
More generally, anything that exists in the world requires a human 
observer to endow it with meaning and significance.
83
 
 
81. JAMES HEARTFIELD, The “DEATH OF THE SUBJECT” EXPLAINED 16 (2002). 
82. 10 JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON 
KNOWLEDGE, xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 
1984) (1979). 
83. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. 
Anscombe et al. trans., P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte eds., Wiley-Blackwell, rev. 4th 
ed. 2009) (1953). For what is perhaps the original source of this idea, Wittgenstein 
explains in Philosophical Investigations, that meaning is just use, which is to say that 
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The meaning that society gives these things, however, is not random 
or coincidental. As the post-structuralists acknowledge, the meaning an 
observer grants to something depends on the observer’s past social 
experience. That experience comes from somewhere. Maybe the 
experience is nothing more than other discursive formations—other 
irrational, socially constructed meanings—in which case this line of 
thinking provides no progress to any deeper meaning or explanation. 
If, however, all meaning is socially constructed, do all people 
necessarily construct meaning equally? It would seem not. To use 
Foucault’s example in Discipline and Punish, teachers examining 
students affect those students’ subjective understandings of themselves, 
but students do not affect teachers to the same extent.
84
 The teacher is 
able to make “normalizing judgments,” whereas the student is not.85 Why 
is that? If people are oppressed by discourse in general, but only some 
people can effectively use discourse to oppress others, then discourse is 
asymmetrically oppressive. This asymmetry alone implies the existence 
of some structure that is more foundational than the discursive 
formations to which people respond. If ideas have power, why do some 
people’s ideas have more power than others? 
 
B. Towards a Coherent Account of Power 
 
If ideas have power but some people’s ideas have more power than 
others, then maybe what we call “power” is not coherent partially 
because it refers to more than one phenomena. It seems that the word is 
used in three similar ways, depending on the “direction” that power is 
experienced. To experience the “power” of another is to experience 
constraint—it is to feel that your options are curtailed compared to what 
your options would be absent the other’s power. To exercise power, on 
the other hand, is the ability to do something without constraint. Finally, 
to have power over another is never to control their behavior in an 
absolute sense, but to modify their behavior by constraining their 
options—for example, the power of legal property in the criminal code 
 
even basic words cannot be defined according to the things to which they refer, because 
the object a word refers to cannot give the word meaning. For example, there is no 
physical distinction between pointing to an apple to indicate its shape, its color, the 
general category of thing it belongs to, and so on—the meaning of these properties must 
be ascribed to it by a human observer. 
84. See FOUCAULT, supra note 14. 
85. Id. at 180. 
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does not prevent people from choosing whether or not they acknowledge 
objects, land, and ideas as others’ property— rather they are presented 
with the choice of either acknowledging another’s “property rights” or 
risking jail. 
One paradigmatic experience of another’s power is being physically 
detained. In a (purely theoretical) Hobbesian state of nature,
86
 this type of 
power—the raw physical constraint of another—might be the only type 
of power people experience. Most of us, however, feel constrained in our 
everyday lives without the threat of impending arrest—we feel 
constrained by social convention, by other’s expectations, by other’s 
opinions of us, and so on. As Peter Gabel observed in Phenomenology of 
Rights Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, we deny 
ourselves all the time through withdrawn, performative, and alienated 
behavioral patterns, even though no one in particular locks us into 
them.
87
 We are constrained in fact because we are constrained by our 
own minds, even absent any physical constraints. 
But is the constraint we place on ourselves ontologically the same 
as the physical constraint others can place on us? If someone wants to 
apply power to another, it would seem that either physically 
overpowering the other, or inducing self-repressive thoughts could have 
the same effect: the other’s options are constrained and her behavior 
altered according to the wishes of the person exercising power. 
One way we might try to disentangle these two types of “power”—
the internal experience of self-constraint, and the external experience of 
physical constraint—is to consider whether they are functionally 
equivalent and how they might differ. To use Gabel’s example, if you 
find yourself withdrawn and alienated when speaking to a bank teller,
88
 
feeling constrained from initiating any genuine personal interaction, that 
feeling of constraint might be as effectively restricting as if you feared 
for your safety were you to speak genuinely. It would be at least 
hypothetically possible however, to think yourself out of this feeling of 
constraint. Liberating ideas could counter self-repressive ideas. 
In contrast, if one wants to make an “unauthorized withdrawal” 
from a bank and then realizes that, were they to do so, the armed bank 
guard would threaten them with violence and apprehend them, no 
 
86. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 81-86 (A.R. Waller ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1904) (1651). 
87. See Gabel, supra note 12, at 1567-71. 
88. Id. at 1567-68. 
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amount of liberating thought will free someone from that constraint.
89
 In 
this case, it is actually the individual’s own thought that restrains her 
from trying to expropriate money from the bank, but her thoughts are in 
direct reference to a physical threat that would in fact prevent her from 
carrying out the attempt. People cannot think themselves out of 
handcuffs or away from guns pointed at them. The power of physical 
violence creates fixed self-restricting ideas in a way that vaguer cultural 
or social conventions create mutable self-restricting ideas. 
This represents a fundamental difference between the ways the 
power of self-repression and the power of direct physical violence 
operate: the former is internal and contingent only on one’s own mind; 
the latter is additionally contingent on the physical facts of material 
reality. 
This distinction seems clear, substantial, and not entirely subjective 
on the individual level of one person physically coercing another or 
experiencing internal constraint. The equation is somewhat different, 
however, on an institutional level. Armies and police might physically 
coerce people, threaten violence, and so on, but guards, soldiers, and 
police officers seem primarily to follow orders not out of fear of their 
colleagues, but because they believe in the legitimate authority of their 
superior officers. Orders are followed by police and soldiers because of 
what those orders subjectively mean to the police and soldiers. Though 
some soldiers (and to a far lesser extent police) may fear violence from 
their colleagues so that their obedience is mutually reinforced by how 
they expect the others to act, this explanation becomes increasingly less 
plausible the higher up the chain of command one goes. 
While the previous example in the bank showed that the material 
power of implied threats of violence can cause self-restraining ideas, 
here we can see that self-restraining ideas about obedience to legitimate 
authority also translates into material power of organized violence. If this 
is the case, then it would seem that the two “types” of power have not 
really been disentangled at all, because they remain interchangeable. 
An alternative description of the relationship between the two types 
of power is possible. Though the implied threat of violence creates self-
repressing beliefs, and these self-repressing beliefs can create organized 
violence, the relationship between them is not symmetrical. Once the 
 
89. Perhaps someone could theoretically persuade the guard to join a revolutionary 
expropriation or some such thing, but unlike in the former example offered by Gabel, the 
fact of the constraint depends not only on one’s own thoughts and inhibitions, but on the 
material threat posed by the guard. 
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choice to introduce the threat of organized violence, such as police 
enforcement of the criminal law, is made, new beliefs among those not 
wielding organized violence are insufficient to change the parameters of 
constraint. Generals can disobey orders from their civilian leaders when 
the power of beliefs and culture is sufficiently persuasive to override the 
ideological authority of an established chain of command, but unarmed 
protesters cannot effectively resist riot cops when ordered to disperse; 
they can refuse to comply with police orders, but the protesters can still 
be physically moved or arrested regardless if faced with overwhelming 
force. In this way, while the constraining power of beliefs can causally 
explain physical force, and physical force can causally explain the 
constraining power of beliefs, physical force takes precedence. 
To generalize this observation, one might say that, in a system 
where both violence and self-restraint are present, the implied threat of 
violence is analytically prior to self-restraint, even while each could 
contribute to the other. This is to say that it is possible to investigate and 
analyze the effect of the threat of physical force on someone without 
having to proceed via an investigation of the self-restraining ideas that 
exist independently of that physical force, but it is not possible to 
adequately and completely analyze the self-restraining beliefs without 
examining the physical force that conditions them.
90
 This analytic 
priority does not, however, actually extend to the people who threaten 
physical force themselves—understanding why the police decide to beat 
up protestors requires an understanding of the false necessities and self-
repressive beliefs the police officers hold and experience. For protestors 
facing charging riot police, however, understanding all of their loosely 
associated self-repressive beliefs is unnecessary to explain why they 
flee—their dispersal in the face of physical violence can be explained by 
the threat of physical violence alone. 
The self-restricting belief that restrains one from expropriating 
money from a bank has its referent in the threat of violence from the 
bank guard—or the latent threat of violence from the state. The belief 
cannot be understood without considering the latent threat of violence in 
criminal law—in other words, self-repression requires the threat of 
physical repression to condition it, even if this threat is far from the 
forefront of an individual’s mind at any given point. On the other hand, 
 
90. This model of an analytically-prior relationship is a modified version of an 
explanation found in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 96 (Nicholas Bunnin 
& E.P. Tsui-James eds., 2d ed. 2003). 
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the physical reality of a bank guard arresting a bank robber can be 
understood absent an analysis of the self-restraining beliefs of a potential 
bank robber. 
A significant challenge to the Marxist economics-based theory of 
alienation and oppression has come from those who would attribute 
explanatory power to beliefs instead of economic structure. Habermas, 
for instance, argues that oppression and liberation were contingent more 
on language and communication between people than on anything 
intrinsic to the economy.
91
 The perception of physical coercive power, 
however, underlies the language and communication between people and 
effects the transmission and reproduction of self-restraining beliefs. 
Moreover, as will be discussed in greater detail below, violence is in 
significant ways “pre-linguistic,” in that language is not needed to 
understand pain and physical constraint. 
In this way, we can answer the question earlier posed of why some 
people’s beliefs and ideas have more power than those of other people. 
Beliefs are most constraining when they have their referent in threatened 
or latently threatened force. The referent may be quiet direct, as in the 
case of the prospective bank robber, or the referent may be several steps 
removed, such as a student who wants to meet a teacher’s standard on an 
examination so that they will be physically able to go to college. On an 
even more indirect level, this may help to explain why some political 
ideas—like voting Democrat or Republican—are entertained widely no 
matter how much they differ from individuals’ actual policy preferences, 
while other political ideas—like socialism and anarchy—are beyond the 
realm of consideration (except in those places where socialist 
revolutionaries have violently seized power in the past). The latent threat 
of state violence in defense of the current economic system limits and 
constrains the realm of the possible. Ideas with the most traction are also 
often those that are supported by force—they seem inevitable, not simply 
out of “false necessity,” but because they cannot be overcome by reason 
alone. 
 
C. How Clarifying the Nature of Power Resolves Dilemmas in CLS 
 
For an example of how this thinking could clarify other problems in 
critical theory, consider the debates over pornography. Catherine 
 
91. See 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD 
AND SYSTEM (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1981). 
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MacKinnon argues that pornography is oppressive to women, but does 
not similarly argue that pornography is oppressive to men.
92
 How could 
an image of a naked woman be “oppressive” when an image of a naked 
man is not? If we consider the images as signifying nothing beyond 
themselves, then analytically this makes no sense—the two types of 
images have no ontological differences. Despite this, pornography is 
much more likely to cause some women to feel shame, discomfort, 
embarrassment, and anxiety. Relatedly, many women may avoid entire 
red light districts so as to avoid the thoughts evoked by the visible 
presence of pornography and sex work,
93
whereas it is much more rare for 
men to react this way.
94
 The difference between the apparent power of 
the two sets of images cannot be internal to the images—analyzing the 
images alone cannot explain why porn featuring females is more 
constraining or “oppressive” than porn featuring males. One way to 
explain the difference in people’s reaction is that one has the threat of 
violence against women as its perceived referent; the other does not 
evoke any allusion to references to material force. One evokes a 
reminder in women that they could be in physical jeopardy from male 
sexual interest—the other evokes no such reminder because men do not 
typically feel similarly vulnerable. 
Another example is the difference between the power the “n-word” 
has to influence, enrage, and frighten people, with the absence of such 
power in racial slurs directed at white people. Racial epithets for white 
people have relatively little emotional impact because there is no sense 
of physical vulnerability from being white. No one has ever gotten 
kicked out of a neighborhood, lunch counter, bus seat, swimming pool, 
country club, or rail car because they are white. White people do not feel 
physically excluded or under suspicion from others due to their race. 
Racism against black people, however, has provided the ideological 
context of slavery, lynching in the South, frequent harassment, terry 
stops, and arrests by the police.
95
 The “n-word” reminds people of the 
threat of violent coercion that existed and, to a large extent, still exists in 
 
92. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
93. For a discussion of possible harms of pornography denied legal recognition see 
id. 
94. Anecdotal, but convincing, evidence of this is the complete absence of any 
men’s movement to censure the use of men in pornography—whereas many women’s 
groups have made pornography a central issue for political agitation. 
95. For a brief historical account of racism in the United States see GEORGE M. 
FREDRICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY (2002). 
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society, as well as reminding people of the physical exclusion of black 
people from racist institutions. Epithets for white people, however, have 
no such sting because they do not evoke reminders of anything like that. 
And yet, neither viewing pornography nor hearing the “n-word” 
amount to actual physical violence in that, while they remind many 
observers of structural inequality and physical risk, this is not a necessary 
relationship. It is possible to think oneself out of being constrained by 
pornography or racial epithets against people of color. A redescription or 
reinterpretation of pornography or racial epithets can provide them a new 
narrative decoupled from the implied threat of violence so that the ideas 
evoked by them are no longer constraining. But when they do prove 
constraining, the asymmetry in the constraint can only be explained by 
analyzing something physical beyond the ideas themselves. 
Another way to explain the power of ideas along these lines is that, 
while the presence of physical coercion gives rise to self-constraining 
ideas in reference to that physical threat, it is the self-constraining 
ideologies that transmit coercive power, making physical force effective 
beyond all proportion to its actual threat. Lenin supposedly said that “one 
man with a gun can control [one hundred] without one”—presumably 
without having one hundred bullets.
96
 The threat of violence in this way 
carries vastly more power than could be exercised by actual violence, 
because it causes people to police themselves—but they only police 
themselves in reference to the potential for a violent response if they 
chose to do otherwise. 
The subjectivity of power and construction of identity described by 
Foucault could also be informed by the observation that latent material 
power is analytically prior to self-constraining beliefs when both are 
present. The perception of who is materially powerful affects the 
construction of identity, in that the judgments of those with physical 
power affect our subjective experiences of ourselves to a far greater 
extent than the judgments of those without power. A vivid example of 
this is the way people will often think nothing of walking straight past 
homeless people without so much as acknowledging their existence, even 
when the homeless person tries to talk to them. The homeless person’s 
judgment has little or no effect, can bring no shame, and can modify no 
behavior, because they are so marginal that their feelings about who 
someone else is are unlikely to be internalized. Compare this with how 
 
96. Quotes by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, GOODREADS, 
http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/show/34739 (last visited Jan. 9, 2012). 
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the praise or displeasure of our parents when we are young can radically 
affect the way we think about ourselves. Parents’ relationship to young 
children is one in which they have almost absolute physical power, and a 
child is completely dependent on parents for her necessities of life. 
Without considering the relative material power of the homeless person 
or the parent, it is not obvious why one wields so much power over 
beliefs, while the other wields so little.
97
 
Once beliefs supported by physical force are in place, they can 
cause people to act or refrain from acting absent any genuine threat of 
violence (as noted in the racial epithet and pornography examples). In 
this way, the two types of power—the physical power of the latent threat 
of violence and the power of self-constraining ideas—both act as 
constraints, but there is a path-dependent relationship between them. 
 
D. Might Violence Be Nothing More than a Subjective Construct As 
Well? 
 
This Article has previously referred to the notion that violence, pain, 
and physical constraint may be phenomena that can ground explanations 
of social and individual behavior without succumbing to the radical 
subjectivity found in most systemic explanations, because these 
phenomena are in some ways “pre-linguistic.” Much more work must be 
done, however, to make this claim credible. 
What is really distinct about violence? Slavoj Žižek, in his book 
Violence, described how actions by the police are often felt to be part of 
the normal state of existence, whereas similar actions by criminals or 
those considered “terrorists” are felt to be really violent.98 For example, a 
radically post-modernist stance might lead someone to argue that 
violence is not pre-linguistic, in that to even understand a police officer 
striking a protestor with a baton as an act of “violence,” one must 
understand what swinging a baton against another signifies. In a world 
without human subjective experience to endow it with meaning, there is 
nothing particularly special about that type of action as compared to any 
other action. Many more might similarly argue in all seriousness that 
police handcuffing a suspect is not an act of violence, while smashing the 
 
97. Adjusting for familiarity and length of exposure—to just say that parents are 
socially influential and homeless people are not is of course to beg the question of why 
that is the case. 
98. This is a significant simplification. See SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, VIOLENCE: SIX SIDEWAYS 
REFLECTIONS (2008).  
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inanimate and unfeeling windows of a bank is an act of violence. 
First, it is necessary to disentangle this problem. That people dispute 
what is and is not violence, often for obvious reasons of political 
sympathy, does in fact mean that the word itself, as used, is not entirely 
stable. Violence is an emotionally charged concept, and for good reason. 
People may be reluctant to recognize violence as such, in part because it 
often means extending empathy to those on the receiving end of 
violence. Empathy is almost necessarily extended when we think of an 
interaction as violence against a person, because we all recognize 
violence against ourselves as an unpleasant thing. However, people 
typical fail to extend that recognition to all third parties. For example, to 
some a mugger seizing someone to steal their wallet may, despite lack of 
bodily injury, be considered “violent,” while a police officer seizing 
someone to search them for drugs may not be considered “violent.” With 
a more precise definition of violence, however, it will become apparent 
that this is not a real distinction, and thus it does not undermine this 
Article’s thesis. 
To say that one person coerces another person requires a narrative 
structure to describe what exactly is going on. When one hears of one 
person coercing another, knowing what this signifies further requires an 
understanding of how to interpret that narrative. But to experience acts of 
physical coercion against one’s self is to experience the limitations of 
one’s body as it exists in the material world. This experience is still 
subjective, but because humans are not immaterial abstract narrators, but 
physically embodied beings, we have a degree of uniformity in the limits 
we experience in the material world. 
We can call oxygen and water whatever we want, but regardless of 
what we call them and what meaning, properties, or categories we 
ascribe to them, they are not ignorable given the nature of the human 
body. Without oxygen for a couple of minutes our physical systems and 
mind stops functioning. Likewise, without water for a couple of days our 
bodies, and eventually our minds, start to shut down. One of the 
parameters of behaviors and thought is the type of being doing the 
behaviors or thinking, and human beings have specific boundary 
conditions. 
Physical coercion or violence similarly brings our attention to 
human boundary conditions. Enough pain will absorb all or most of 
one’s thoughts and attention; it is not ignorable—not something that can 
29
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be avoided with redescription.
99
 When someone is put in a room behind a 
locked door, she cannot think herself out; she is confronted with the 
material reality that her movements are restricted to within that room—
she cannot will it another way with any amount of self-liberating ideas. 
Of course, the experience of violence is still subjective, and people 
can have different thoughts about it. People can sustain getting beaten 
up, or decide to sacrifice themselves for some greater purpose. But even 
in these instances violence and physical coercion constrain their options 
and demand their attention. Moreover, while some may attempt to 
sustain violent attacks against their person, there are real physical limits 
to how much violence they can sustain, and most people react 
similarly—not for entirely socially constructed reasons, but for reasons 
having to do with the limits of their anatomy. 
An arguably even more radical challenge to this line of thinking is 
the argument that the individual as an entity is itself a social invention. 
Foucault argued that the body only became a unit of analysis in the 
eighteenth century, and prior to this individual bodies were dissociable 
into the collective population.
100
 For Foucault, the individual is itself a 
social construct which does not have a prediscursive meaning.
101
 
Feminist legal theorist Robin West argues that the distinctness and 
separateness of individuals, and the assumption that “the word 
‘individual’ has an uncontested biological meaning” is contestable.102 
West argues that this view of individuals amounts to a “separation 
thesis” that is only “trivially true of men,” and “patently untrue of 
women.”103 West goes on to write that: 
 
Women are not essentially, necessarily, inevitably, 
invariably, always, and forever separate from other 
human beings: women, distinctively, are quite clearly 
“connected” to another human life when pregnant. In 
fact, women are in some sense “connected” to life and to 
other human beings during at least four recurrent and 
critical material experiences: the experience of 
pregnancy itself; the invasive and “connecting” 
 
99. See ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE 
WORLD 51 (1987). 
100. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS 336 (Vintage 1994) (1970). 
101. Id. 
102. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988). 
103. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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experience of heterosexual penetration, which may lead 
to pregnancy; the monthly experience of menstruation, 
which represents the potential for pregnancy; and the 
post-pregnancy experience of breast-feeding.
104
 
 
Both Foucault and West, however, have merely offered alternative 
definitions or ways to think about and talk about the term “individual”—
they have not really destabilized the actual meaning with regard to the 
human experience of psychological individuality. True, the meaning of 
the word is contingent, but the ontological fact of certain differences 
between the experience one has of herself and the experience one has of 
anything else is unchanged. In fact, contrary to West’s account, the 
“subjective awareness of separation” does in certain ways “define 
consciousness.”105 Even if on some essentially metaphorical level 
women are “connected” to others during those four sets of 
experiences,
106
 women (and men) retain distinct mental states. We cannot 
experience another’s mind, or her thought processes or mental states, in 
the direct way that we do our own—our unmediated mental life is 
confined to ourselves.
107
 To the extent that West describes two bodies 
intermixing physically, while we might describe the two as being 
connected, they remain experientially distinct in significant ways—one 
does not have the same ability to feel all the sensations going through the 
nervous system of a fetus, a sex partner, or a baby, no matter how 
physically close or even physically inseparable they are.
108
 The 
distinctiveness of the individual mind and individual nervous system 
remains despite West’s redescription, and women are as “essentially” 
distinct from other people in these ways as men. 
Likewise, for Foucault, while sovereigns may have related to 
 
104. Id. at 2-3. 
105. Id. at 1 (quoting ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 
200 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
106. Which actually seems to be a completely subjective, and in some ways 
arbitrary, valuation of certain types of connectivity compared to others. Why is sex more 
connecting than a hand shake, but for the social meaning attached to it? 
107. Notwithstanding our ability to express in a highly mediated way the contents 
of our mental life to others through language and emotional expression, such expressions 
only indirectly convey information about our mental states. Such information is 
necessarily mediated by another’s ability to interpret it. Regardless of how empathetic or 
well attuned they may be, the nature of the experience of hearing and seeing someone 
express the contents of her mental states, and experiencing a mental state for oneself 
directly, remain hugely different and distinct. 
108. See West, supra note 102, at 2-3. 
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subjects as populations rather than as individuals prior to the eighteenth 
century (from a descriptive historical perspective), changing the mode of 
discourse from descriptions of populations to descriptions of individuals 
did not change the ontological qualities of the experience of being.
109
 We 
are aware of our own minds and bodies in a way that we are not aware of 
other’s minds or bodies—this was as true both before and after the 
change in public discourse about individuals that Foucault describes. In 
this way, Foucault may have attributed a false primacy to discursive 
formations concerning people, presuming that these discourses constitute 
the meaning or essence of personal experience. This may be true with the 
way our narrative structures about our experience work, but the narrative 
structures are still about something: the content of the material world; 
and some of that underlying material reality is not simply constructed by 
our narrative structures, but is the basis for those structures. 
The word “I” may only have a meaning in the context of a human 
language with an idea of self-identity, but the ontological facts, such as 
that each person can see through her own eyes only, and not through 
other people’s eyes or random points in space, and that each individual 
can only feel a keyboard under a set of hands connected by nerves to her 
particular brain, and not those keyboards under other sets of hands—do 
not depend on what meaning we attribute to our descriptions about them. 
It is of course possible to add another layer of confusion by 
deconstructing the meaning of the words “see” and “feel” and asking 
what these really mean but for the significance people in society attribute 
to them. Raising such questions, however, does little to erase the material 
fact that we experience the phenomena of feeling and seeing objects in 
space. Even if we had no words for these phenomena, we would still 
experience them. Likewise, we would still experience the bodily 
limitations imposed on us by acts of violence. 
Another line of critique against the thesis advanced in this Article is 
that the examples given (of pornography and racial epithets) are just too 
convenient to ground the experience of social self-repression in 
general.
110
 The prior examples have some proximity to violence that 
becomes clear with an explanation. More difficult examples are those 
that deal with experiences that feel in some way coercive, but do not feel 
coercive because of any credible or even historical threat of violence. 
 
109. FOUCAULT, supra note 100, at 335-41. 
110. This criticism was offered by Gary Peller, Professor of Law at Georgetown 
University Law Center, on an early draft of this Article. 
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Nancy Henley, in her book Body Politic, noticed how, when among 
strangers, women tend to look at men when they are not themselves 
being watched, but when a man looks back at them, most women will 
tend to avert their gaze.
111
 In this way, the subtle power of one stranger 
over another is experienced even with no present or historical threat of 
violence or any overt attempt to exercise power. Hierarchical observation 
in Foucault’s prison guard example is obviously tied to violence, but 
here, and in most of life, the connection is not so clear.
112
 
One might argue, however, that the connection still exists; it is 
simply several steps more removed. A prisoner may alter her behavior 
under the gaze of the guard out of fear that the guard will beat her up or 
lock her in solitary confinement if she does not behave according to the 
guard’s wishes. However, someone who averts her gaze to avoid meeting 
the eyes of a stranger still acts out of a feeling of physical vulnerability, 
of apprehension about her own body in relation to the stranger. She does 
not, for example, similarly avoid eye contact with animals, nor does she 
avoid eye contact with photos of people looking into the camera lens. 
When a woman averts her eyes to avoid the gaze of a man in an elevator, 
it is because, were she to maintain eye contact, conversation and 
interaction would be unavoidable—she would be confronted with the 
physical reality of having to deal with someone she apparently does not 
want to deal with. Physicality, even here, modifies behavior. A person 
late for work might similarly avoid the gaze of her supervisor while 
shuffling in to her cubicle. In both instances the gaze draws her attention 
to the more socially powerful person’s judgment of her, and makes it 
similarly difficult to ignore. 
Being judged poorly by people who are felt to be more socially 
powerful might be a long way away from a prisoner being judged poorly 
by a prison guard, but this does not mean that it is devoid of connection 
to latent social violence, only that it is many more steps removed. If one 
falls out of favor with one’s peers and social superiors, than one can be 
overtly and subtly cut off from the material and social goods that she 
wants to have access to, because social superiors, backed by the force of 
the state, can restrict access. The most obvious example is that if one 
does not please her social superiors, she might fail to get a job or 
promotion and will have less access to money; she cannot adjust the 
 
111. NANCY M. HENLEY, BODY POLITICS: POWER, SEX AND NONVERBAL 
COMMUNICATION 164 (1986).Of course, this observation may be anachronistic. 
112. See FOUCAULT, supra note 14. 
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situation with a “self-help solution” because access to the job and money 
are controlled by social superiors who can call on the state to enforce 
their wishes with physical force. 
More subtly, being subjected to negative judgment from one’s peers 
and friends can lead to barriers being erected to one’s access to social 
goods—whether those barriers are explicitly recognized or not—and they 
may be enforced by the state. If someone is judged in such a way that 
leads to others refusing to associate with her, or declining to invite her to 
their parties, or even just subtly reducing their level of voluntary 
association, then that person’s options have still been materially limited 
in a way that she cannot simply think herself out of. If she tries a “self-
help” solution of stalking or trespassing, the people who have judged her 
can also call on the coercive apparatus of the state to protect their 
freedom to refuse to associate. Moreover, any attempt to solve 
interpersonal problems by ignoring the way another person has judged 
someone will only result in a greater degree of judgment and loss of 
social status, which is, again, ultimately backed up by physical 
constraints. 
 
III. CONCLUSIONS: CONSEQUENCES FOR QUESTIONS IN 
LEGAL THEORY 
 
In this concluding Section, I will consider several ways this thesis—
that latent social violence is analytically prior to self-restraining ideas—
can help to resolve significant questions in legal and social theory. First, 
we can use it to reconsider the problem Hale poses for Marxists on how 
the ruling class can determine the law when the law determines the ruling 
class. Earlier in this Article, the question was posed: how does one know 
that Sally is the owner of the farm and Marsha is the trespasser? The 
initial conclusion is that the only way to know is when the police evict 
Marsha—had the court decided that Marsha had a privilege to be on the 
farm and Sally had a duty of non-interference to Marsha, then Sally 
could not be considered the owner. 
But the courts and police do not decide the distribution of property 
rights in some ad hoc or random way. They instead allocate them by 
recognizing property rights and extending state enforcement, to people 
whom other prior state institutions similarly recognized. State 
enforcement agents approach cases in which individuals dispute 
ownership—such as theft and trespassing cases—with a preconception of 
who owns what, and that preconception is in reference to the past use of 
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force to back up property claims made over that parcel of land or item in 
the past. They look to whom the state recognized as the owner in the past 
and how the state recognized lawful transmission of ownership in the 
past. 
The self-constraining ideas about property that lead judges and 
police to act in coercive and distributive ways are therefore themselves 
conditioned by, and in reference to, the prior use of force by others and 
the expectation of how force would be used. In this way, the post-
structuralists are correct that all components of society influence each 
other and no one is actually in control as a prime mover. But this is only 
one part of the story and only really true at a single point in time—not 
over the course of history. Previous use of force exerts a unidirectional 
influence on subsequent use of force, because it establishes an 
expectation for how force will be used that leads people to constrain 
themselves in line with these expectations. 
This Article also illustrates that the CLS notion that there is no pre-
political market or power dynamics for the state to intervene into, 
because all power dynamics come from the state’s decisions to grant or 
withhold enforcement to different property or other rights claims, is an 
only true to a certain extent. It is true that, absent the threat of violence 
from the state, a hundred factory workers could easily expropriate a 
factory from a single factory owner, offering a “self-help” solution to a 
dispute over how much they ought to be paid. However, there are limits 
to “self-help” because there are limits, absent the state, to how much an 
individual or a group can physically accomplish. A “no trespassing sign” 
requires a threat of state enforcement to actually prevent trespassing. 
However, a tall solid wall will deter someone from crossing into a certain 
parcel of land absent state enforcement. 
Similarly, to say that laws permitting pornography privileges the 
pornographers to “injure” women who feel offended and objectified by 
pornography is only part of the story.
113
 The other part is that, absent that 
supposed state privilege, it is not entirely clear that radical feminists 
could adopt a self-help solution and physically compel people to stop 
making and viewing porn. There are practical limitations to how much 
power can be applied, as evidenced for instance by the fact that, despite 
strict laws against drugs, drugs remain readily available virtually 
everywhere to anyone who invests time in obtaining them. 
Another interesting consequence of this thesis is that it helps to 
 
113. See MacKinnon, supra note 92. 
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clarify the difficulty people have in accepting anti-essentialist group 
definitions, such as Judith Butler’s deconstruction of gender114 and 
Richard Ford’s deconstruction of race.115 Gender might have a physical 
corollary in anatomical and chromosomal sex, but the so-called 
performance of gender is social and one might choose to perform in 
different and possibly subversive ways. Likewise, although race has 
certain corollaries in physical appearance, it is merely a social concept in 
that race only exists insofar as people attribute significance to those 
physical characteristics. In both gender and race, the physical 
characteristics do not determine the social performance or the social 
meaning—people could choose to attribute different meanings and 
perform differently. 
Does this mean that people can redefine themselves and transcend 
race and gender? Unfortunately not, perhaps, because while the 
categories of race and gender may be social constructs, they are social 
constructs that in practical reality have been crystallized by way of 
physical force. The notion of a “black race” or “white race” were no 
more real or biologically based in the American South in the 1950s than 
they are today, but if a “black” person decided to redefine themselves as 
beyond race and sit down at the wrong lunch counter prior to the civil 
rights movement, they could be arrested. Today, when police officers 
stop young black male drivers, essentially for “driving while black,” the 
driver’s idea of his own race is irrelevant to the physical confrontation 
that might unfold.
116
 
Yet, by more clearly delineating the difference between power that 
cannot be overcome by one’s own liberating thoughts (repression by 
threats of physical violence) and power that depends on one’s own 
notion of false necessity (self-repression), we can also see where Mark 
Tushnet and Peter Gabel’s self-liberating aspirations apply.117 The notion 
that we can essentially think ourselves into a revolution against the state, 
against the private capitalist economy, is wrong because, while the state 
and capitalism do depend on self-repressive ideas, it is not our self-
repressive ideas that ultimately enforce them, but those of the police and 
 
114. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990). 
115. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in 
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994). 
116. For a discussion of this phenomenon and its consequences, see David A. 
Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 
MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999). 
117. See Gabel, supra note 12; Tushnet, Rights, supra note 8. 
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soldiers who, through threats of violence, dictate the parameters for 
personal emancipation with or without the consent of any individual. 
However, there are also numerous other institutions that have 
profound power over people’s daily lives and that can be defied simply 
by refusing to buy into the sway they have over most of us by way of our 
own self-repressive ideas. These institutions can be defied precisely 
because they can be potentially ignored, because there is no (or minimal) 
organized violence to back them up and so they rely wholly on individual 
consent for their power. Many people unquestioningly obey “doctor’s 
orders” despite real physical and financial risks of overtreatment, over-
screening, iatrogenic injury, and death.
118
 Many others unquestioningly 
change their behavior to avoid committing “sins” according to the 
prescripts of organized religion. Still others modify their behavior to 
avoid the bad feelings caused by various forms of social judgment and 
expression, including those that have a subjective referent in violence but 
no actual credible threat of violence to back them up, such as 
pornography. In each of these cases (doctors, religions, and 
pornography), while the messages conveyed may feel repressive, the 
feeling of compulsion is truly a false necessity, because, unlike the 
implied threat of the criminal law, nothing physically compelling gives 
them force. These are precisely the situations in which self-liberation as 
Gabel and Tushnet described really can “work”—and work sometimes 
with immense social consequences.
119
 
 The thesis advanced in this Article and the conclusions briefly 
described in this final Section are not meant to be a final, definitive 
statement on how material power relates to self-constraining ideas, or 
how the legal system relates to the economy and social power. Instead, 
this Article is meant to serve as a starting point exploring how one might 
try to move beyond irrationalism, while remaining cognizant of the 
critiques advanced by the post-structuralists on prior attempts to 
systematically explain society. At best, the theory advanced in this 
Article—that the power of latent social violence is analytically prior to 
the power of self-repressive ideas—should be a way of restarting the 
conversation on how we can account for social structure and social 
change. The point is to show that having such a conversation after post-
 
118. For an exploration of the assumption of obedience to physicians see Gerry V. 
Stimson, Obeying Doctor’s Orders: A View from the Other Side, 8 SOC. SCI. & MED. 97 
(1974). 
119. See Tushnet, Rights, supra note 8, at 1402-03; see also Gabel, supra note 12, at 
1587-88. 
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structuralism remains possible, worthwhile, and necessary if we want to 
gain a better understanding of law and society. 
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